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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Life Insurance-Effect of Homicide Exclusion in Double Indemnity
Clause
The recent case of Goldberg v. United Life and Acc. Ins. Co.' indi-
cates a trend toward a new interpretation and construction of double
indemnity clauses in life insurance policies. The facts were as follows:
the insured and another gentleman were observed in discussion in a
social club; the insured apparently addressed harsh and profane words
to his companion; the companion thereupon struck the insured with his
fist; the insured fell backward, striking his head on a concrete floor and
suffering a concussion from which he died a short time later.
The defendant company earlier had issued to the insured certain life
insurance policies containing double indemnity clauses.2  Plaintiff, the
wife of the insured, had been named beneficiary. The defendant com-
pany immediately paid to the plaintiff the total face value of the policies,
but refused to pay double indemnity, basing its refusal on two grounds:
(1) the insured did not meet his death by accidental means within the
coverage of the policies, and (2) the insured's death resulted from
"homicide," a cause of death expressly excluded from the double in-
demnity insuring agreements.
As to the defendant's first ground, the court conceded, without de-
ciding, that the evidence was sufficient to show prima facie that the in-
sured met his death through accidental means within the insuring pro-
visions of the policy. Of necessity, in every case which turns on ex-
clusions from a double indemnity provision the court must reach this
conclusion, since there can be no recovery of double indemnity in any
event if death does not result from accidental means. Although this
presents a problem of real significance in many fact situations, the better
reasoned authorities apparently would support the court's conclusion
on this set of facts.8
'248 N.C. 86, 102 S.E.2d 521 (1958).
'The pertinent stipulation read: "The United Life and Accident Insurance
'Company ... promises to pay Double Indemnity .. in the event that such death
should result directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury
effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means . . . provided suich
death shall not have resulted from homicide .... " (Emphasis added.)
' To determine whether a death results solely from accidental means, the situa-
tion must be considered from the viewpoint of the one killed. Releford v. Reserve
Life Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 228, 276 S.W.2d 517 (1955). The assailant can act in-
tentionally and the death still result solely from accidental means. Black v.
Massachusetts Acc. Co., 57 ILI. 237, 189 At. 3 (1937). Although an injury may be
intentionally inflicted by another, nevertheless, if the injury was not naturally to be
foreseen by the insured, death results from accidental means within the meaning of
a double indemnity provision. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Distretti, 159 Tenn. 138,
17 S.W.2d 11 (1929). But, "where the insured is the aggressor in a personal en-
counter and commits an assault upon another with demonstration of violence and
knows, or under the circumstances should reasonably anticipate, that he will be
in danger of great bodily harm as the natural and probable consequence of his act
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However, the court affirmed a dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint
on the second ground, holding that the evidence disclosed conclusively
that the insured met his death by "homicide" within the meaning of the
exclusion in the policy. This was true despite the fact that the com-
panion, in striking the blow, had no intent to kill.
Technically, the decision is correct when considered in view of the
broad legal definition of the word "homicide'-the killing of one human
being by another human being.4 Nevertheless, the court in this decision
seemingly has gone further than any other reported American case,
although a careful analysis of the reported decisions will disclose a trend
toward construing the provision "homicide" liberally in favor of in-
surance companies.
The situation most obviously included as a homicide is the one in
which the insured is the victim of a felonious intentional killing amount-
ing to first degree murder. The insurance company, of course, is not
liable in such a situation.5 Also, where the insured is killed incident to
the commission of a felony the courts seem to agree that death results
from "homicide" within the meaning of the policy exclusion.6 Such a
killing is first degree murder under the felony-murder rule. However,
where the killing is done by an insane person, the courts early developed
.... his injury or death may not be regarded as caused by accidental means."
Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 244 N.C. 502, 505, 94 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1956).
However, "even where it appears the insured is the aggressor in an altercation,
his ensuing death may be held as [resulting from accidental means] ... provided
it also appears the insured was in such mental condition that he could not reasonably
anticipate he would be in danger of great bodily harm as a probable consequence of
his acts." Newton v. Colonial Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 113, 115
(E.D.N.C. 1957).
It would seem clear that in the principal case the insured would not have had
reason to anticipate that death would result from his calling his companion a vile
name. Death would not be the natural and probable consequence of that act. Thus,
death can be said to have resulted solely from accidental means.
'Black v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., supra note 3. "Homicide includes both
intentional and unintentional killing. It is justifiable when committed by an officer
in the discharge of duty . . . excusable when committed accidentally or in self de-
fense, felonious when committed maliciously ... or negligently as in manslaughter."
Great So. Life Ins. Co. v. Akins, 105 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
See also State v. Williams, 231 N.C. 214, 56 S.E.2d 574 (1949) ; State v. Satterfield,
198 N.C. 682, 153 S.E. 155 (1930); State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 51 S.E. 945
(1905) ; State v. Turnage, 138 N.C. 566, 49 S.E. 913 (1905).
'United Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Willoughby, 182 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1950) (in-
sured killed when his house was intentionally dynamited); Lloyd v. Unity Life
Ins. Co., 225 La. 585, 73 So. 2d 470 (1954) (insured stabbed by assailant) ; Great
So. Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 24 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (insured in-
tentionally murdered without provocation).
'McLendon v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 557, 31 S.E.2d 429 (1944)(insured beaten to death by a robber) ; Langvin v. Rockford Life Ins. Co., 338 Ill.
App. 499, 88 N.E.2d 111 (1949) (insured beaten to death by burglars); John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tabb, 273 Ky. 649, 117 S.W.2d 587 (1938) (in-
sured's head smashed by robber) ; Wozniak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
288 Mich. 612, 286 N.W. 99 (1939) (insured shot while resisting robbery of'filling
station) ; Black v. MWassachusetts Acc. Co., 57 R.I. 237, 189 Atl. 3 (1937) (insured,
killed in robbery attempt).
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an exception to the rule of non-liability of an insurance company. 7 These
decisions are based on the theory that the word "homicide" as used in
the policy was not intended to be given its broad meaning by the parties,
but was intended to include intentional homicide only.8 This would
exclude murders by insane persons9 since they cannot be said to possess
the requisite intent.'0
Many courts in cases not involving insane persons have held that
the term "homicide" as used in these policies must be construed as
meaning only intentional homicides. 1 The case most nearly contra
to the decision in the principal case is Seaboard Life Ins. Co. v. Mur-
phy.'2 In that case the assailant, thinking the insured had insulted him,
made a harsh remark to him. The insured did not intend to strike the
assailant but assumed such an attitude of defense that the assailant
might reasonably have thought he had such intent. The assailant struck
the insured with his fist causing him to fall backward and to crush
his head on a cement floor. The court held that death resulted solely
through external, violent, and accidental means and did not ensue as a
result of "homicide." The court felt that the term as used in the policy
embraced only intentional killings. In the Seaboard case the assailant
did not intend to kill the insured and employed no means reasonably
calculated to cause death. The assailant was guilty at most of simple
assault.'3  This case is not readily distinguishable from the principal
case.
. Great So. Life Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 148 Miss. 173, 114 So. 262 (1927)(insured shot by insane person without any provocation or legal justification);
Day v. Interstate Life and Acc. Co., 163 Tenn. 190, 42 S.W.2d 208 (1931)(in-
sured killed by insane man with axe) ; Texas Life Ins. Co. v. Plunkett, 75 S.W.2d
31.3 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (insured shot by insane man).
"The courts generally hold that the word 'intentional' must be read into the
contract, and the company is exempt from liability only Where the homicide was an
intentional one." Day v. Interstate Life and Acc. Co., 163 Tenn. 190, 192, 42
S,W 2d 208, 208 (1931).
.!The possibility of such a construction has led some insurance companies to
adopt a more inclusive wording.. The life policy in Great So. Life Ins. Co. v.
Akins, 105 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), had a clause providing for double
irndennity for death resulting from accidental means except where death resulted
from "intentional or unintentional homicide due to the act of a sane or insane
person." (Emphasis added.)
" o Cases cited note 7 .ypra. In cases turning on a "homicide" exclusion, the
courts make no mention of the fact that an insane person may intend to do the
very act which causes death and yet not have the requisite intent to kill necessary
for a cririjinal conviction. Such a distinction has been drawn where the exclusion
was for "injuries intentionally inflicted by another person." Deloache v. Carolina
Life. Ins. Co., 104 S.E.2d 875 (S.C. 1958).. However, this would seem to be a
definite minority view. See 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTIC § 482( 1941)..
• See, e.g., Walters v. Great Nat'l Life Ins., Co., 132 Tex. 454, 124 S.W.2d
850.,(1939).
"134 Tex. 165, 132 S.W.2d 393 (1939).
&( This would be true in Texas, at least. See, e.g., Flournog v. State, 124 Tex.
ciin. '395, 63 S.W.2d 558 (1933).
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The case most nearly in accord with the decision in the principal
case, and the one relied upon by the North Carolina court, is United
Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prostic.14 There the insured died of heart
failure resulting from a beating inflicted by robbers. The facts were
such as to raise the inference that death was not intended by the robbers.
The court denied recovery on the ground that death resulted from
"homicide" within the meaning of the exclusion from the double in-
demnity clause. It was decided that the word "homicide" could not
reasonably be restricted to mean only intentional killings, for thiswould
eliminate many manslaughters and also many first and second degr~e
murders; especially under the felony-murder rule or where death was
substantially likely to follow from the course of action pursued.
This case is distinguishable from the principal case in that in the
Prostic case the killing dearly would be first degree murder under the
felony-murder rule. In the principal case the companion had no intent
to kill the insured, the felony-murder rule would not be applicable, and
it would seem, at most, that he might be guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter.
Perhaps the strongest ground of attack upon the decision in the
principal case is its disregard of certain fundamental principles of in-
surance contract construction. It is said that an insurance contract
should be interpreted according to its plain meaning--even that mean-
ing accorded to the words by the man on the street. 16 It is submitted
that, among laymen, an accidental killing amounting at most to in-
voluntary manslaughter is not generally considered "homicide." Also,
where provisions are uncertain or ambiguous they should be interpreted
most favorably to the insured and construed most strongly against the
insurer.17
"169 Md. 535, 182 Atl. 421 (1936).
Wozniak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 288 Mich. 612, 286 N.W. 99
(1939).
" Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947) ; Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co. v. Casualty Under-
writers, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. Minn. 1955); Weissman v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1953) ; Lingo v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 32 Ala,
App. 525, 27 So. 2d 697, cert. denied, 248 Ala. 367, 27 So. 2d 700 (1946) ; Arenson
v. National Automobile and Cas. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955);
Johnson v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 234 N.C. 25, 65 S.E.2d 347 (1951).
'" Mah See v. North Am. Acc. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421, 213 Pac. 42 (1923);
McLendon v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 557, 31 S.E.2d 429 (1944);
Langvin v. Rockford Life Ins. Co., 338 Ill. App. 499, 88 N.E.2d 111 (1949);
Hooper v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 318 Mich. 384, 28 N.W.2d 331 (1947) ;
Wozniak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 288 Mich. 612, 286 N.W. 99 (1939) ;
Barker v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 397, 85 S.E.2d 305 (1955) ; General Acc.,
Fire, and Life Assurance Corp. v. Hymes, 77 Okla. 20, 185 Pac. 1085 (1919).
However, there is a definite argument contra, that where a word has a clear and
well recognized legal meaning, it should not be perverted merely to benefit the
insured. Langvin v. Rockford Life Ins. Co., supra; McLendon v. Carolina Life
1958]
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However, the North Carolina decision, whatever one may think of
it on its facts, poses an even more serious question: will the construc-
iion of the word "homicide" be extended to include negligent killings
of one human being by another? An example of such a situation would
be where death is caused by the negligent operation of an automobile.
The technical legal definition of the word clearly would include such an
extension. I8 It would be but a short step from the present North Caro-
lina decision to a holding that there was a "homicide" where death
resulted from gross negligence in a situation amounting to involuntary
manslaughter. The Maryland court has suggested that the definition of
"homicide" not be extended to include deaths resulting from negligent
acts, but that it should be restricted to deaths resulting from voluntary
acts. Should the North Carolina court refuse to follow the Maryland
view, but choose instead to extend the definition of "homicide" to include
death resulting from negligence, a double indemnity clause would be
worthless in a large number of cases. Carried to its furthest extreme,
only those persons dying from such natural causes as flood or lightning
would be able to recover double indemnity. Whether this would be a
desirable consequence or not, the public and the legal profession are
entitled to be made aware of the dangers involved. It would seem that
if insurance companies desire to be absolved from liability where death
results from unintentional or negligent homicides, they should so specify
in their policies. 19 Perhaps definitive legislation is needed in this area.
THaOMAS W. W~aRiCK
Taxation-Estate Tax-Charities-Gifts to Bar Associations
Testator bequeathed $5,000 to the Rhode Island Bar Association to
be used "for the advancement and upholding of those standards of the
profession which are assumed by the members upon their admission to
the Bar, and for the prosecution and punishment of those members who
Ins. Co., supra; Wozniak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., stpra Compare
in connection with both points of view this statement: "A policy of insurance and
every clause and part thereof is the contract, and, like all contracts, should be
construed so as to effectuate the real purpose and intention of the parties, giving
to the language employed, when unambiguous, its ordinary and usually accepted
meaning." Frontier Mortgage Corp. v. Heft, 146 Md. 1, 12, 125 AtI. 772, 776
(1924).
28 "An intention to kill the victim is not, of course, an essential of homicide
in its ordinary and usually accepted meaning. There are accidental homicides,
and homicides by misadventure, or involuntary manslaughter, as they are some-
times called, in which there is no intention to kill or harm at all." United Life
and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prostic, 169 Md. 535, 538, 182 Atl. 421, 422 (1936).
1" See note 9 supra.
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